Diesel Fuel Cleaning
 

FDGM - Detail of DTI Test Report U.S. Navy

 

 

 

 

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose
This test report documents for FDGM, Inc., the requirements, responsibilities, results, and actions accomplished by Dynamic Testing (DTI) during the MIL-S- 901D heavyweight, high impact shock testing of the MHC Isotta Fraschini diesel engine High Pressure Common Rail (HPCR) fuel injection system including Hoffman enclosure with Heinzmann Electronic Control Unit (ECU). In addition, FILTREX self-cleaning lube oil filter, SEPAR fuel/water separator, and the ALGAE-X fuel conditioner were tested.

This report covers the pretest period, the fixture and machinery installations aboard the floating shock platform (FSP), actual test operations, instrumentation setup, physical inspections, and operational tests. Operational performance tests were performed by FDGM, Inc., representatives.


1.2 Background

The Isotta Fraschini Motori Diesel Engine is mission-essential equipment aboard the MHC and MCM Class ships, and has been previously qualified.

In response to feedback from the fleet, FDGM, Inc., and Isotta Fraschini Motori developed several enhancements for the IF 6V-AM and 8V-AM engines installed onboard the MCM-3 and MHC-51 Class ships. The engine improvements listed in Paragraph 1.1 have been developed to reduce maintenance time and cost, to eliminate costly human error, to reduce the possibility of engine failure due to low load operations, and to enhance the engine performance.

This shock test was performed to qualify HPCR system components installed on the IF engine.

1.3 Objective

The objective of this report is to document the results of heavyweight shock tests performed on the diesel engine HPCR components, FILTREX ACXC-76-40-H Automatic Self-Cleaning Lube Oil Filter, SEPAR water separator, and the ALGAE-X fuel conditioner in accordance with MIL-S-901D (Navy) dated 17 March 1989. The report is to be submitted for fulfillment of requirements for shock qualification acceptance and installation on-board MCM-3 and MHC-51 Class ships.

2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

2.1 Military Specification

MIL-S-901D (Navy), "Military Specification, Shock Tests, H.I. (High Impact); Shipboard Machinery, Equipment and Systems, Requirements for," dated 17 March 1989

 

2.2 NAVSEA Drawing

NAVSEA Mounting Drawing No.53711-180-6644653 “C” (PBI DRAWING NO. 9700-180-053), Ship Service Generator Foundations

 

2.3 Dynamic Testing Drawing

DTI Drawing No. J-329, Rev A, "Test Fixture for UNDEX Testing the Raft Mounted 6V Isotta Fraschini Diesel Engine"

 

2.4 FDGM, Inc., Drawings

·  FDGM Drawing No. 150-062-00-1, REV.-, ENGINE MOUNT, SM20, LOW PROFILE.
·  FDGM Drawing No. MHC570, HOFFMAN BOX HPCR
·  FDGM Drawing No. MHC617, JUNCTION BOX (Injector)
·  FDGM Drawing No. MHC618, JUNCTION BOX (Sensor)
·  FDGM Drawing No. MHC620, HOFFMAN BOX WIRING DIAGRAM
·  FDGM Drawing No. MHC621, HPCR SYSTEM WIRING DIAGRAM MHC-51
·  FDGM Drawing No. MHC638, HPCR SYSTEM WIRING DIAGRAM MHC-52, 55, 58 & FOLLOW
·  FDGM Drawing No. MHC639, HPCR SYSTEM WIRING DIAGRAM MHC-53, 54, 56, & 57

 

2.5 Isotta Fraschini Drawings

Isotta Fraschini Drawing No. 74777F96, "Installation drawing, 6V-AM Engine Model 2894 F01 - Modified with 54SF SW/FW Cooler Assy & Vibracon Mounting System"


Isotta Fraschini Drawing No. 1T343399, “Installation Drawing, 8V-AM HPCR Fuel Injection System”

 

2.6 Manufacturers Technical Manuals

·  Vibracon® SM Manual No. 150.062.00-2, "Adjustable Steel Chocks Installation Manual with the Isotta Fraschini 6V-AM Torque Criteria"
·  FILTREX Model ACXC-76-40-H Automatic Self-Cleaning Lube Oil Filter Service Manual No. 42.3ACX.7.GB
·  Heinzmann ECU Service Manual No. MV99 002-e/07-99 and MV99 003- e/09-99
·  Power Star UPS model 6000 Technical Manual FDGM NO. MHC 592

 

3.0 DESCRIPTION OF TESTED ITEMS

The HPCR system for an Isotta Fraschini Motori 8V-AM engine. The HPCR system components are:
·  1T343380 Common Rail Left IFM
·  1T343379 Common Rail Right IFM
·  1R343393LA Double Wall Drain Tube IFM
·  1R343394LA Fuel Injector Return Drain Tube IFM
·  1T343395LA Tube Injector Pump to Rail 1&2 Left and 3&4 Right IFM
·  1T343396LA Tube Injector Pump to Rail 1&2 Right and 3&4 Left IFM
·  1T343397LA Tube Rail to Injector Nozzle IFM
·  1T343398LA Tube Cross-Connect Rail to Rail IFM
·  1P613171 Pressure Transducer IFM
·  1P611870 Rail Pressure Relief Valve IFM
·  1S343550 Fuel Injector Complete IFM
·  76969F91 Mod. Fuel Injection Pump IFM
·  MHC 570 Hoffman Enclosure with ECU IFM
·  MHC 618 Junction Box Sensor IFM
·  MHC 617 Junction Box Injector IFM
·  FILTREX Model ACXC-76-40-H Automatic Self Cleaning Lube Oil Filter
·  SEPAR Water Separator Model No. 2000/18 UMK.
·  ALGAE-X Fuel Conditioner Model FC

 

3.1 Overall Equipment Dimensions/Weight/Center of Gravity

3.1.1 Engine with HPCR System Installed

Wet weight: 6,009 pounds
Sub-base: 1,680 pounds
Vibracon® and hardware: 47 pounds
Engine dimensions (overall): 66.9 inches long by 52.7 inches wide by 58 inches high
Engine center of gravity:
Fore/aft: 18.9 inches aft of the front crankshaft end
Vertical: 4.3 inches above the centerline of the crankshaft
Athwartship: 0.4 inches starboard of the engine centerline

 

3.1.2 FILTREX ACXC-76-40-H Automatic Self-Cleaning Lube Oil Filter

Wet weight: 302.4 pounds
Dimensions (overall): 38.5 inches long by 19 inches high and 15 inches wide.

 

3.1.3 SEPAR Water Separator

Wet weight: 35 pounds
Dimensions (overall): 24.6 inches long by 9 inches wide and 18 inches high.

 

3.1.4 ALGAE-X Fuel Conditioner

Wet weight: 25 pounds
Dimensions (overall): 18 inches long and 3.5 inches in diameter

 

3.1.5 Hoffman Box with ECU

Weight: 45 pounds
Dimensions (overall): 24 inches high by 24 inches long and 9 inches wide

 

3.1.6 Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS)

Weight: 229 pounds
Dimensions (overall): 30 inches high by 19 inches long and 20 inches wide
This unit was shock isolated and not part of the test for qualification.

 

3.1.7 Junction Box (Sensors)

Weight: 15 pounds
Dimensions (overall): 11inches high by 8 inches long and 4 ¾ inches wide

 

3.1.8 Junction Box (Injector)

Weight: 15 pounds
Dimensions (overall): 11inches high by 8 inches long and 4 ¾ inches wide

 

3.2 FSP-Borne Weight Pounds

Diesel engine: Isotta Fraschini ID36 SS8V- AM - 6,009 lbs.
FILTREX Automatic Self-Cleaning Lube Oil Filter Model No. ACXC-76-40-H. - 302 lbs.
SEPAR Water Separator Model NO.2000/18UMK - 35 lbs.
ALGAE-X Fuel Conditioner Model No. FC UNIT - 25 lbs.
UPS Model 6000 - 229 lbs.
Hoffman Box with ECU Model MVC 01-10/20 - 45 lbs.
2 Junction Boxes (Sensor & Injector) - 30 lbs.
Raft - 1,680 lbs.
Test fixture - 3,357 lbs.
Piggy-back DAU (not part of IF Test) - 700 lbs.
Canopy - 7,000 lbs.
Total Weight Borne by FSP: 19,412 lbs.

 

4.0 TEST REQUIREMENTS

4.1 Ordering Data per MIL-S-901D

 

4.1.1 Applicable Specification

MIL-S-901D (Navy), "Military Specification, Shock Test, H.I. (High Impact); Shipboard Machinery, Equipment and Systems, Requirements for," dated 17 March 1989

 

4.1.2 Equipment Class

Class I - Hard mounted
Hoffman Enclosure with ECU
ALGAE-X Fuel Conditioner mounted on FSP
FILTREX Lube Oil Filter mounted on FSP

 

Class II – Resilient Mounted
Engine with HPCR System
SEPAR Water Separator mounted on subbase
Junction Box (Sensors) mounted on subbase
Junction Box (Injector ) mounted on subbase

 

4.1.3 Shock Grade

Grade A for all test items.

 

4.1.4 Shock Test Type

Type A – Principal Units
Hoffman Enclosure with ECU
Junction Box Sensors

Junction Box Injector
Filtrex Lube Oil Filter
ALGAE-X Fuel Conditioner mounted on FSP
Separ Water Separator mounted on subbase

 

Type B – Subsidiary Components
Engine with HPCR System

 

4.1.5 Mounting Location

All test items were hull mounted

 

4.1.6 Test Classification

Heavyweight

 

4.1.7 Mounting Orientation

·  Engine mounted on a raft with the crankshaft parallel with the fore/aft axis of the FSP, which coincides with the fore/aft axis of the ship.
·  Hoffman enclosure with ECU mounted on fixture with the front & back parallel with the fore/aft axis of the FSP, which coincides with the fore/aft
·  axis of the ship.
·  FILTREX mounted a fixture parallel to the port & starboard axis of the FSP, which coincides with the port/starboard axis of the ship.
·  ALGAE-x mounted a fixture parallel to the port & starboard axis of the FSP, which coincides with the port/starboard axis of the ship.
·  The two Junction boxes (sensor & injector) mounted on the subbase with the front /backs parallel to the port & starboard axis of the FSP, which coincides with the port/starboard axis of the ship.

 

4.1.8 Simulated Masses

None

 

4.1.9 Exceptions to MIL-S-901D

 

Shot sequence was 2, 3, 4, and 1 vice the standard 1, 2, 3, and 4. A fifth shot at 20 feet was conducted to validate Vibracon mount operations.

 

5.0 TEST INSTALLATION/CONFIGURATION

 

5.1 Equipment Installation

Photograph Nos. 1 and 2 show the equipment installations aboard the barge.

 


Photograph No. 1. Overhead view of FSP

 


Photograph No. 2. Overhead view of FSP

 

5.1.1 Diesel Engine with HPCR

The diesel engine was hard mounted utilizing 12 each Vibracon® SM 16 adjustable K-monel chocks installed between the engine mounting rails and the subbase secured with Grade 8, ¾” X 6” bolts.

 

The subbase was fabricated and provided by NAVSSES, Carderock Division. The installation of the diesel to the subbase was accomplished by FDGM.

 

The subbase/diesel assembly was installed on a test fixture designed and fabricated by Dynamic Testing (DTI). The interface of the subbase with the test fixture was accomplished via four 6E2000 resilient mounts provided by NAVSSES. The resilient mounts were integrated with a set of integral snubbers provided by DTI.

 

The diesel/subbase assembly with resilient mounts and snubbers were attached to the resilient mounts utilizing four each 1 1/4-inch diameter, Grade 8 hex head cap screws. The resilient mounts were attached to the test fixture utilizing eight each 7/8-inch-diameter, Grade 8 hex head cap screws. The test fixture was 24 inches tall and welded directly to the inner bottom of the FSP. The engine-to-subbase fasteners were installed and torque to 225 ft – lbs. I.A.W. Tech Manual S9233- B9-MMM-010 Diesel Engine Model 2894F01 ID 36 SS6V-AM Chapter 8.

 

5.1.2 Hoffman Enclosure with ECU

The enclosure with ECU was hard mounted to a bulkhead foundation with six 3/8” stainless steel bolts and self-locking nuts. The fixture was welded directly to the FSP innerbottom.

After the second shot, the enclosure was modified and four DTI-2A-038x38 shock mounts were installed. The mounts were attached to the bulkhead foundation with eight 3/8” Grade 5 bolts and self-locking nuts.

 

5.1.3 FILTREX Self-Cleaning Lube Oil Filter

The filter was hard mounted to a foundation with four 5/8” stainless steel bolts and self-locking nuts. The foundation was welded directly to the FSP innerbottom.

 

5.1.4 SEPAR Water Separator

The separator was hard mounted to a fixture with four 3/8” Grade 5 bolts and selflocking nuts and the fixture was attached to the engine sub-base with four ¾” Grade 8 bolts and 2 mm studs.

 

5.1.5 ALGAE-X Fuel Conditioner

The conditioner was hard mounted to a foundation with four 3/8” stainless bolts and self-locking nuts. The foundation was welded directly to the FSP innerbottom.

 

5.1.6 Sensor Junction Boxes

Junction box was hard mounted to a fixture by FDGM Inc. with three 3/8” Grade 8 bolts and stover nuts and the fixture was welded to the engine sub-base.

 

5.1.7 Injector Junction Boxes

Junction box was hard mounted to a fixture by FDGM Inc. with 3/8” Grade 8 bolts and the foundation was attached to the engine sub-base with ½” Grade 8 bolts and self-locking nuts.

 

5.2 Foundation Bolt Torques

The required mounting bolt torques were measured and recorded in Appendix B.

 

5.3 Mode of Equipment Operation

 

5.2.1 Diesel Engine with HPCR

The HPCR System was operating at a rail pressure of 400 bar (5,800 psi) during all shots of the test series. The UPS was powered by 115 VAC from ashore and the UPS supplied 28 volts of D.C. power to the HPCR Hoffman enclosure with ECU. The ECU provided 90 Volts DC (20A/ms rise time) output to the injector nozzles. The 90-volt DC signal to the solenoid on the injector nozzle opened the 3-way valve. The rail pressure was controlled by the ECU through the Governor Actuator. The excess fuel from the injector pump was returned to the supply tank. The excess fuel from the injector was returned to supply tank via 20-psi inline relief.

 

A 15-horsepower motor drove the HPCR injection pump and Governor Actuator. The injection pump supplied fuel to the common rail and injector. The engine camshaft position sensor was mounted on the actuator drive and a measuring pin was located in the injection pump drive coupling, the crankshaft speed and position sensor will use a test fixture adapter to mount sensor and measuring wheel. The measuring wheel was driven off the S/W pump drive. The crankshaft speed and position sensor was not driven by the crankshaft on the engine. The lube oil pressure, air boost pressure, jacket water temperature and exhaust temperature curves of the Heinzmann program were disabled. All eight nozzles were electrically connected, however, only six were supplied with high-pressure fuel from the rails.

 

5.2.2 FILTREX Self-Cleaning Lube Oil Filter

The oil filter was hydraulically pressurized at a typical operating pressure of 100
psi during the test.

 

5.2.3 SEPAR Water Separator and ALGAE-X Fuel Conditioner

The separator and fuel conditioner were filled with fluids during the test.

 

6.0 TEST METHOD

 

6.1 Test Facility

The test was conducted in accordance with MIL-S-901D at the facilities of DTI.  This test facility is approved for testing in accordance with NAVSEA INST 9491.1C.

 

7.0 SHOCK TEST ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

 

7.1 Operational Acceptance Criteria/Failure Definition

In accordance with MIL-S-901D, Paragraph 3.1.10.1, “Grade A items shall withstand shock tests in accordance with this specification without unacceptable effect upon performance and without creating a hazard.”

 

Momentary malfunction shall be considered acceptable only if it is automatically self-correcting and comes back up to normal operational status, or can be corrected/bypassed with limited operator intervention. This will be acceptable only if no consequent derangement, loss of operation, or compromise of the Grade A capability is caused by the momentary malfunction. Limited operator intervention does not include resetting internal circuit breakers, reseating of circuit cards, reconnecting cables, etc.

 

Functional tests of critical components must be successfully completed. All failures will be evaluated as to their effect on the mission keeping capability.

 

7.2 Mechanical Acceptance Criteria/Failure Definition

The absence of major physical damage and continued function in accordance with required engine performance characteristics before, during and after each shot will be the basis for passing the test. Major physical damage is defined as any damage which prevents primary functionality (operational) of the HPCR System under test, or if any portion of the HPCR System comes adrift so as to pose a hazard to adjacent Grade A equipment or personnel.

 

Minor physical damage to test items, such as small cracks, minor yielding of structure, out of tolerance clearances, and similar damage shall not be cause for shock test disapproval unless such damage causes unacceptable impairment of equipment performance, results in a hazard, or results in substantially shortened equipment useful life. The following examples would be considered minor damage and not be cause for disapproval: deformation of non-critical structure, fracture of any structurally insignificant welds, etc. In addition, damage to subsidiary components of the engine, which are not part of this test, shall not be cause for shock test failure.

 

Damage to any HPCR System component, which will result in fuel leakage, will constitute a failure of that component. Cracking in the welds or casing of any of the following components shall constitute a failure of that component: FILTREX Lube Oil Filter, SEPAR Water Separator and ALGAE-X Fuel Conditioner. Leakage from any of the following components shall constitute a failure of that component: FILTREX Lube Oil Filter, SEPAR Water Separator, and ALGAE-X Fuel Conditioner.

 

After each shot, the torque of mounting bolts were measured and the results recorded in Appendix B. If yielding of the attachment bolts occurs, the shot may be considered invalid. Excessive bolt torque loss may be evidenced by a single occurrence of significant rotation of the fastener. Fasteners were re-tightened after the first shot only to compensate for seating of mating surfaces.

 

7.3 Electrical Acceptance Criteria/Failure Definition

The electrical acceptance criteria will be based on continuous operation of the HPCR system. The input power shall be monitored for maintenance of the input power specifications. The analog and digital HPCR system I/O shall be monitored for proper continuous operation within the I/O specifications provided in the following table. A failure is defined to be any parameter out of pass/fail criteria specification and shall be accepted on a case-by-case basis Electrical monitoring was conducted by NSWCCD.

 

7.4 Post-Test Acceptance Criteria

If after the test examination reveals no impermissible damage and if HPCR system is capable of full power operation, the system shall be subjected to post shock acceptance testing. Testing shall include successful completion of remaining PMS-490 sponsored HPCR Endurance Test – US Navy cycles (100 hours). Results will be proved in under separate cover.

 

8.0 TEST INSTRUMENTATION

Instrumentation was installed on selected HPCR System components and on the FSP during the test series to monitor the shock-input parameters. One velocity meter (VM) and four accelerometers were installed and monitored during the test series to determine shock input and response to the equipment. Instrumentation locations are listed in the table below:

 

Item
Orientation
Location
VM1
Vertical
Inner bottom blast side
A1V
Vertical
Top of test fixture
A2V*
Vertical
Top of engine left common rail, adjacent to a mounting bolt
A3V
Vertical
Top Rear of Hoffman Enclosure foundation
A4V
Vertical
3 Left Injector, Top
A5V
Vertical
Top Rear of Hoffman Enclosure

 

Notes: A5V was added after the 2nd shot and the Hoffman Enclosure was modified with shock isolators. A2V was moved to the Lower Rail for the 5th shot and A3, A4, and A5 were removed.

 

9.0 TEST RESULTS

9.1 Test Schedule

 

Test No.
Date
Time (EST)
1
02 March 2001
10:01
2
02 March 2001
14:16
3
06 March 2001
12:47
4
06 March 2001
15:28
5
07 March 2001
13:47

 

9.2 Summary of Modifications Incorporated During Testing

 

9.2.1 After Shot 1, Test 2 (30-foot athwartship)

 

9.2.1.1 The sump drain lines were re-routed to improve gravity flow and reduce diesel fuel spillage. The drain lines were not test items; but were test support equipment.

 

9.2.1.2 Spacers were installed on the previously qualified junction box ears.

 

9.2.2 After Shot 2, Test 3 (25-foot athwartship)

 

9.2.2.1 The Hoffman Box installation was modified by installing four DTI-2A-038X38 mounts on the rear. Figure (1) shows the modification.

 

 

9.3 Survey Findings

Pre- and post-test inspections were conducted before and after each shock test.

 

9.3.1 Survey Findings Prior to Testing

 

9.3.1.1 Action: All components were visually inspected for any physical damage.

Observation: No physical damage was noted.

Resolution: None required.

 

9.3.1.2 Action: Record foundation bolt torque and electrical operational readings.

Observation: All foundation bolts were at the correct torque and all electrical readings were within stated specifications.

Resolution: None. Results are recorded in Appendix B. System was ready for test.

 

9.3.2 Survey Findings after Shot 1, 30-foot Standoff, 02 March 2001

 

9.3.2.1 Action: Conducted a visual inspection.

 

Observation# 1: The sump drain lines did not perform well and there was significant leakage of diesel fuel. Leakage occurred at most bolted surfaces immediately below the injectors.

 

Resolution: The sump return lines were re-routed to improve gravity flow into the sump and no further action was required. These lines were fixturing only and not test items.

 

Observation # 2: The pressure on the FILTREX dropped from roughly 105 psi prior to the test to 75 psi after the test.

 

Resolution: The FILTREX was re-pressurized to 100 psi prior to the next shot and no further action was taken and there were no visible leaks.

 

Observation # 3: The attachment flanges (ears) on the Junction boxes slightly deformed.

 

9.3.2.2 Action: Recorded foundation bolt torque and electrical operational readings.

 

Observation: Representatives from both FDGM and NSWCCD recorded electrical operational readings. There were no anomalies reported in the electrical operations. Hold-down bolts were re-torqued and are recorded in Appendix B. Several engine mounting bolts showed approximately 1/16” turn of loosening and the ALGAE bolts showed about 1/8” turn of
loosening.

 

Resolution: None required. All bolts were re-torqued to original status.

 

9.3.2.3 Action: Verified operation the HPCR system and associated components.

 

Observation: The HPCR system was successfully operated for five minutes after the detonation.

 

Resolution: The system was powered down after five minutes of operation.

 

9.3.3 Survey Findings after Shot 2, 25-foot Standoff, 02 March 2001

 

9.3.3.1 Action: Conducted a visual inspection and verify operation of the HPCR system and associated components.

 

Observation # 1: Just prior to the shot, the hum associated with the system drive motor changed and the motor stopped operating at detonation. It was discovered that a fuse in the 220V house power was blown.

 

Resolution: Initially it appeared that the system drive motor had failed. However, after investigating the problem it was discovered that a chain reaction of events led to the motor being inoperative. The 28 VDC from the UPS was lost prior to the shot due to a power supply failure (verified by the power monitoring effort). The loss of 28 VDC caused the governor actuator to go to maximum fuel position and the electronic metering units to stop functioning thus causing increased fuel pressure. This increased pressure created an excessive load on the motor, which then in-turn blew the fuse.

 

Observation # 2: The circular manual cleaning handle on the FILTREX broke and came adrift.

 

Resolution: None, the FILTREX handle is only required for manual cleaning and is not mission-essential. Manual cleaning can still be conducted by using remaining attachments.

 

Observation # 3: The 28 VDC power from the UPS to the Hoffman enclosure was interrupted. The power supply failed shortly prior to the shot and this was seen by the electrical power monitoring team. It was also noted that the bungee corded mounting fixture impacted hard structure at detonation.

 

Resolution: The power supply was replaced and the bungee cords were reconfigured prior to the next shot.

 

Observation # 4: As trouble-shooting continued, it was discovered that the ECU also failed and prevented the fuel injectors from actuating. At this point it was evident that failure of the ECU caused the failure of the power supply.

 

Resolution: The ECU was visually inspected and no cause of failure was identified. An identical ECU was installed and the engine was successfully run for 10 minutes. The Hoffman box with the ECU installed was modified by installing four DTI-2A-038x38 mounts on the rear (see Photograph No. 6).

 


Photograph No. 6. Modified Shock Isolated Hoffman Box Mounting

 

9.3.3.2 Action: Recorded foundation bolt torque and electrical operational readings.

 

Observation: Representatives from both FDGM and NSWCCD recorded electrical operational readings. There were anomalies reported in the electrical operations when the 28VDC was lost and the system drive motor stopped. Also, it was noted that the signal to the fuel injectors was lost prior to the loss of the 28VDC. Bolt torques were verified and recorded in Appendix B.

 

Resolution: None required. Bolts were left in the as-found condition. The electrical monitoring failures noted are detailed in Paragraph 9.3.3.1 above.

 

9.3.4 Survey Findings after Shot 3, 20-foot Standoff, 06 March 2001

 

9.3.4.1 Action: Conducted a visual inspection and verified operation of the HPCR system and associated components.

 

Observation # 1: HPCR continued to operate at detonation and ran for approximately 13 minutes before being secured.

 

Resolution: None required.

 

Observation # 2: The manual clean hydraulic housing on the FILTREX unit came dislodged when bolts pulled out of the aluminum casing and the piece was found laying on the deck approximately two feet from unit. There appeared to be only three or four thread engagements into the casing.

 

See Photograph No 7 of the adrift housing, and Photograph No. 8 shows the stripped threads.

 

Resolution: None. Unit failed the test and will be modified and tested on a LW or HW machine at a later date.



Photograph No. 7. Broken Housing on FILTREX

 

Observation # 3: The Vibracon mount on the left side of engine, at flywheel in (Left Side Number Six) appeared loose.

 

Resolution: None. It would be thoroughly evaluated after the final shot.

 

9.3.4.2 Action: Recorded foundation bolt torque and electrical operational readings.

 

Observation: Electrical operational functions were inoperative for this shot and no readings were recorded because of operator error. It was deemed that the shot did not need to be repeated just to collect the information because the HPCR continued to operate and the FDGM monitoring of injector firing and fuel pressure indicated that the system was working properly. The firing information was lost on 4 Left when an amp lead came loose. Everything else showed full operation. Bolt torques were verified and are recorded in Appendix B.

 

Resolution: None required. Bolts were left in the as-found condition. The electrical monitoring readings were taken after the fact and all reading were within specifications.

 

9.3.5 Survey Findings after Shot 4, 40-foot Standoff, 06 March 2001

 

9.3.5.1 Action: Conducted a visual inspection and verify operation of the HPCR system and associated components.

 

Observation # 1: HPCR continued to operate at detonation and ran for approximately 18 minutes before being secured.

 

Resolution: None. No action required.

 

Observation # 2: The Vibracon mount that appeared loose after the 20- foot shot appeared tight and torque reading indicated no loosening.

 

Resolution: Upon disassembly, it was noted that the Left Side Number Six Vibracon was tilted and was no longer adjustable. Photograph Nos. 9 and 10 show the slanted Vibracon mount. It is suspected that this slant occurred during the 20-foot standoff shot. Vibracons are not visible when installed. All Vibracon mounts were inspected and this was the only one with any damage. It was also noted that there was only 2 ¾ threads engaged on all of the Vibracons. The normal thread penetration should have been a minimum of five threads interlocking meaning that the item underwent test at a more severe setting then should exist in the most extreme installations on board ships. A decision was make to swap out the Vibracon mounts and conduct another 20-foot shot with just the engine serving as a dummy load to verify the Vibracon mount operations, as if they were installed at the extreme five-thread engagement position.

 


Photograph No. 9. Slanted Vibracon Mount

 

Observation # 3: Opened and inspected the SEPAR.

 

Resolution: No leaks were found and no physical damage to the casing was noted.

 

Observation # 4: Opened and inspected the ALGAE-X.

 

Resolution: No leaks or physical damage was found.

 

Observation # 5: Conducted a non-destructive dye-penetrate test on the engine block at all interface locations with the HPCR.

 

Resolution: No cracks or deformations were noted. Photograph Nos. 11, 12, and 13 show some of the penetration check results.

 

9.3.5.2 Action: Recorded foundation bolt torque and electrical operational readings.

 

Observation: Representatives from both FDGM and NSWCCD recorded electrical operational readings. There were no anomalies reported in the electrical operations. Bolt torques were verified and recorded in Appendix B.

 

Resolution: None required. Test series was complete.

 

9.3.6 Survey Findings after Shot 5, 20-foot Standoff, 07 March 2001

 

9.3.6.1 Action: The HPCR was removed from the engine and other associated hull-mounted items were removed in preparation for the Vibracon validation test. New Vibracon mounts were installed with the correct, five-thread interconnection.

 

Observation # 1: All Vibracon mounts performed correctly. After the detonation all mounts remained adjustable and the torques were verified and found to be around 175 foot-pounds and this was considered to be an acceptable seating in torque loss.

 

Resolution: None. No action required.

 

Observation # 2: The instrumentation data traces received from this test were invalid.

 

Resolution: It was discovered that a lead wire on the velocity meter came loose and this caused all channels to indicate erroneous data. A review of the VHS photographs taken at detonation indicated that the barge displacement and movement was similar to all other 20-foot standoff shots. After discussing the situation with NSWCCD Code 623 it was decided that a repeat test was not required to receive instrumentation data.

 

10.0 PERSONNEL PRESENT

 

Inspector
Representing
Test No(s).
Tim Nogosky
DTI
1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Mike Pearson
DTI
1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Calvin Milam
DTI
1, 2
Charlie Hill
FDGM
1, 2, 3, 4, 5
John Vincent
FDGM
1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Ron Pifer
FDGM
1, 2, 3, 4
Rick Malesky
NSWCCD
1, 2, 3, 4
Jim Robinson
NSWCCD
1, 2, 3, 4
Bill Varmecky
Machine Support
1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Kurt Millson
NSWCCD
1, 2, 3, 4
Chris Cheeseman
NSWCCD
1, 2
Mack Gaubatz
MARITECH
1, 2
Paul Holifield
ANTEON
3, 4, 5

 

11.0 SIGNATURES

Prepared by: _______________________________
Calvin P. Milam, Chief Engineer

Approved by: _______________________________
R. D. Fairfield, Executive Vice President
& General Manager

 

Appendix B

Torque Verification Recordings

 


EQUIPMENT
TORQUE VALUE
Initial Torque
1st Shot
2nd Shot
3rd Shot
4th Shot
8
FUEL PUMP
MOUNTING BOLTS
45 Nm (33 FT LB)
45Nm
45Nm
45Nm
45Nm
45Nm
4
RIGHT RAIL MOUNT
on manifold
16 Nm (12 FT LB)
16Nm
16Nm
16Nm
16Nm
16Nm
6
RIGHT RAIL MOUNT
on rail
16 Nm (12 FT LB)
16Nm
16Nm
16Nm
16Nm
16Nm
6
LEFT RAIL MOUNT
on manifold
16 Nm (12 FT LB)
16Nm
16Nm
16Nm
16Nm
16Nm
6
LEFT RAIL MOUNT
on rail
16 Nm (12 FT LB)
16Nm
16Nm
16Nm
16Nm
16Nm
12
INJECTOR CLAMP
BOLTS
20 Nm (14 FTLB)
20Nm
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
4
SEPAR MOUNTING
BOLTS
40 Nm (30 FT LB)
30' lbs
30' lbs
30' lbs
30' lbs
30' lbs
4
FILTREX MOUNTING
BOLTS (14 mm 8.8)
130 Nm (96 FT LB)
100' lbs
100' lbs
100' lbs
100' lbs
N/A
4
HOFFMAN BOX
MOUNTING BOLTS
(3/8")
40 Nm (30 FT LB)
40Nm
40Nm
40Nm
40Nm
40Nm
11
ENGINE MOUNTING BOLTS
305 Nm (225 FT LB)
W10"
W4"
200' lbs
225' lbs
200' lbs
225' lbs
225'lbs
225' lbs
*160
to
220'
lbs
**200
to
225'
lbs
4
ALGAE-X 3/8" X 8.8
40 Nm (30 FT LB)
30' lbs
30' lbs
NA
NA
23' lbs
6
JUNCTION BOXES
40 Nm (30 FT LB)
Hand Tight
40Nm
40Nm
40Nm
NA

 

* 4” Extension` 10” Extension ** 4” Extension 10” Extension
1L = 190 1R = 190 1L = 220 1R = 205
2L = 175 2R = 160 2L = 220 2R = 200
3L = 220 3R = Missed 3L = 225 3R = 200
4L = 190 4R = 175 4L = 205 4R = 200
5L = 190- 5R = 175 5L = 220 5R = 200
6L = 175 6R = 160 6L = 225 6R = 200

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